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1. Introduction 
Queries are essential for retrieving information. For those who surf the net they can play a 
crucial role. But the relationship between questions and answers involves many classical 
topics, not only in the language sciences, especially in pragmatics, but also in philosophy. It 
would be surprising if the results of such an old, even ancient, inquiry did not inspire 
interesting solutions to present-day research. 
In fact, semantics was born at the beginning of philosophical enquiry, for its own sake. 
Philosophy, conceived as a demand of wisdom and truth requesting the exercise of thought 
(and good will), has the logos as its specific resource. Given that logos is both uttered thought 
and thoughtful word, the mood of reflecting upon speeches and their role in finding and 
telling the truth, asking questions and giving answers, has been present since the beginning. 
As is often the case, an important motivation to meditate and speculate upon logos came out 
of a crisis, with its attacks and instrumental claims about language and human discourse. 
We could identify the Sophist movement, during the development of democracy in the 
Greek poleis, in the fifth century B.C., as such a factor.  
Plato and Aristotle are the obvious significant responses to the Sophists’ extraordinary 
argumentation skills, resting upon relativistic claims.  Dialogue between master and disciple 
as well as an inspection of organon structures emerged as conditions which granted a 
positive and safe attitude towards truth, knowledge, virtue… in short, a good life. 
What was Aristotelic Organon about? The name, meaning instrument, designated, 
according to Andronicus of Rhodes (40 B.C.), Aristotle’s works on logic, philosophy of 
language and of sciences, valid arguments and fallacies. These treatises were so specifically 
designed as praeambula to assuring a self-conscious and self-controlled intellectual activity,  
that they constituted a basic corpus providing safe methodological – deontological premises 
to those who wanted to cultivate philosophy, or simply true knowledge, concerning good 
and happiness in personal and socio-political life, moral virtues or human skills such as art, 
persuasion, the creation of laws and cathartic tragedies. Even more fundamentally, 
however, they concerned being in the physical world and beyond it: through living beings 
(animals and humans) and celestial bodies, up to their first causes to their final end. 
How could this huge scenario disclose its secrets and reveal its hidden structure without a 
self-confident appeal to human powers, and above all to the capacities of human 
knowledge? How was it possible to observe the human way of proceeding from thought to 
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truth without observing those “observable forms of thought” which were human discourse, 
arguments, propositions and their constituents? Was it even conceivable to grasp the inner 
organisation of thoughts without articulating them into nouns and verbs, premises and 
conclusions, while inquiring into their mutual relations? After Plato’s evaluation of dialogue 
as the genuine path to remembering apparently unknown truths and to conquering 
uncontroversial knowledge, it was Aristotle’s enterprise to direct attention to that object-
making of our thinking activity which, during his day, was particularly evidenced by the 
wide diffusion of writing. Written words meant linguistically shaped thoughts. 
To follow a human way of thinking meant following a human way of speech. This is why 
semantics entered the heart of human inquiry about human pretention of truth. The same 
pretention which motivates queries expecting answers. A kind of tension towards avoiding 
mistaken and misleading steps which caused another great philosophical movement, that of 
the Stoics, who cultivated logic in order to argue about ethics. Many of us are unaware that 
most of the grammatical tools through which we still analyse language today come from the 
Stoics: the names of cases (nominative, genitive …), of verbal diatheses (active, passive, 
reflexive) etc.  
This speculative attitude towards language did not only occur in the philosophical schools 
of the classical world. 
For the same reasons – the unavoidable relations between the adventures of thought, 
especially the most audacious and universal on one side and its linguistic expression and 
importance for communication and dialectic argumentation on the other – semantics was 
also considered highly important in the Medieval universities. This took the form of 
gramaticae speculativae and grammars de modis significandi, and  the relationships between 
modi essendi, intelligendi and significandi were explored.  
Another crisis marked a new historical turn, from the Middle Ages to the modern era. The 
multiplication of national languages, the progressive neglect of Latin as a common 
language, the scientific revolution together with political conflicts led to another crisis. It 
was a semiotic crisis together with a new semantic demand. From Locke to Leibniz, from 
Port-Royal to the Encyclopédie, many new questions arose: about the affordability of ideas 
linking words and world, or – from a reduced horizon - about connections between words 
and thoughts and their invariant structures in spite of the diversity of idioms, or otherwise 
about the possibility of building artificial languages to provide good demonstrations, to 
allow the construction of machines à penser. 
It would be sufficient to look at the categories of ancient grammars to see how heavily they 
were charged with semantic functions: nouns called substantives, adjectives characterised as 
qualifiers, possessives, demonstratives, conjunctions labelled as final, causal, concessive etc. 
One of the permanent aims animating linguistics as a science over the last two centuries 
remains the distinction, if not a separation between form and function, between the 
description (or generation, or historical reconstruction) of formal linguistic devices (often 
conceived as a sufficient task) and the ascription of prototypical, but not unexceptionable 
functions. 
Over the last two centuries, in fact, language has been a focus of attention for a multitude of 
disciplines: linguistics, semiotics, philosophy of language, psycholinguistics and cognitive 
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sciences were born and developed while sharing the same basic area but seen from quite 
different perspectives. 
What characterises philosophical semantics above all is the triangular relation among signs, 
thoughts, things (states of affaires, events, situations): whereas linguistic semantics has 
mainly dealt with, and still deals with, intra-linguistic relations. Referential semantics has 
thus become central to the philosophy of language, going from existential judgements (does 
what is spoken about exist?) to the role of determinants (definite vs. indefinite descriptions, 
indexicality, singular vs. plural reference), up to the different ways of referring (proper 
names vs. common nouns), or to the scope of operators such as quantifiers or negation etc.  
Cognitive semantics is devoted rather to the skills and performances involved in processing 
semantic information. 
Very often, in semantic inquiries, the order of magnitude has gone from the minimum of 
single words (searched as terms of synonymic or antonymic relations, for instance) to the 
maximum of propositional units evaluable as true or false. Only gradually and rather 
recently have intermediate structures such as noun- and verb phrases with their 
determinants, syntactic relations, nominal or pronominal substitutions, up to single speech 
acts or conversational turns become objects of inquiry. 
In the following paragraphs we shall see how and why. 
2. The structure of a query 
2.1 Questions … about queries, questions and /or queries 
Let us begin by stating whether a question and a query are the same.  
A question is a sort of speech act, with its particular illocutionary force and standard structure.  
In ordinary language, it is marked either by a typical intonation (in oral communication) or 
by a dedicated interpunction, a question  mark (in written communication), often together 
with further markers, such as introductory interrogative lexical items (pronouns, adjectives, 
adverbs, such as the 5 wh), a typical word order (e.g. VSO vs. SVO etc.), some special devices 
(auxiliary verbs, correlated adverbial or adjectival forms, such as, in English, ‘to do’, ‘ever’ 
vs. ‘never’, ‘any’ vs. ‘some’ etc. ).  
‘Query’ is the term used to define what users enter into a web search engine, in order to 
retrieve information. Its normal form is that of an item being identified as a query by being 
placed in a special field designed to be filled in with some subject, key-word or quotation in 
the context of a search-engine interface.  Such a context helps the authors of queries to save 
time and energy in the self-activation of their queries as such. Formats for queries already 
serve as devices to make the subject of a query recognisable as such. 
In computing, a query language is a language in which queries are passed to and 
information retrieved from a database or information system. 
2.2 The problem of ranking and the struggle for escaping carelessness 
Usually, grammars introduce interrogative structures after the affirmative ones. 
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Such an expository and explanatory order seems to suggest the idea of a sort of precedence 
in ranking of so-called declarative or assertive sentences vs. interrogative and also negative 
ones. 
Is this ranking the right one? 
a. On the linguistic/grammatical side, it seems more a matter of didactical priorities than 
of intrinsic communicative dynamics. In fact, answers follow questions. Furthermore, 
both in interrogative and in declarative moods negation comes as a meta-operation, 
something which intervenes upon an already imposed structure, a super-imposed 
structure. 
b. Another trend in favour of such ranking has been the long-held attitude in philosophy 
of considering only statements as sentences par excellence. Their excellence is due to their 
relationship to truth. They were known as orationes perfectae, both in the sense of 
accomplished, (and therefore complete), utterances, and in the sense of being able to 
reach the top, the truth. Austin calls such an overestimation of declarative sentences 
compared to all other kinds of sentences a ‘descriptive fallacy’: “To overlook these 
possibilities in the way once common is called the ‘descriptive’ fallacy”. Which 
possibilities? “It was for too long the assumption of philosophers – Austin claims – that 
the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some states of affairs, or to ‘state 
some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely. … But now, in recent years, many 
things which would once have been accepted without question as ‘statements’ by both 
philosophers and grammarians have been scrutinized with new care. … First came the 
view … that a statement (of fact) ought to be ‘verifiable’, and this led to the view that 
many ‘statements’ are only what may be called pseudo-statements. First and most 
obviously, many ‘statements’ were shown to be … strictly nonsense… so that it was 
natural to go on to ask, as a second stage, whether many apparent pseudo-statements 
really set out to be ‘statements’ at all. … for example, ‘ethical propositions’ are perhaps 
intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in 
special ways. … It has come to be seen that many special perplexing words embedded 
in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd 
additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the 
circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or 
the way in which it is to be taken and the like.”(Austin, 1962). We shall return to this 
fallacy shortly. 
2.3 Different kinds of questions: yes-no questions vs. completive questions, closed 
vs. open questions 
In any case, what traditionally has contributed to establishing such a questionable ranking, 
or the idea that interrogative structures are modifications, transformations1 of declarative 
                                                 
1 Cf. (Chomsky, 1957) and beyond, minimalism included (Chomsky, 1995), for his transformational 
grammar.  
Indeed, “Under generativist approaches, non-subject questions - like passives – are formed by 
movement. However, whereas passives are formed by NP-movement, questions are formed by 
movement of the auxiliary from I to C (subject-auxiliary inversion) and - for wh-questions – by 
movement of the wh-word from within VP to SPEC CP (wh-movement) […]. Interestingly – observe 
Ben Ambridge and Elena V.M. Lieven – a preferential-looking study […] has shown that children aged 
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ones,  is, in my opinion, an unconscious preference shown towards one kind of questions 
only, the so-called “oriented” ones. 
In a case such as:  
1. Peter won the game   
2. Did Peter win the game? the proper order seems to be the proposed one. But if we 
consider 
3. Who won the game? or 
4. What did Peter win? 
(3) and (4) clearly show that to ask is something which comes first – has a certain priority - in the 
development of our knowledge, and pushes forward the development of knowledge itself2. 
According to the usual classification, interrogative sentences are of two kinds: partial and 
general, completive (wh-questions) or oriented (yes-no questions)3. 
The purpose of completive questions is to inquire about the identity of a missing element in 
the information available to the speaker. The questioned identity may be that of a person 
                                                                                                                            
as young as 1;8 are able to respond appropriately (i.e. differentially) to subject and object wh-questions 
(What hit the book? Vs. What did the book hit?), suggesting early knowledge of (from a generativist 
perspective) inversion. 
The challenge for generativist account is therefore to explain why, given that knowledge of subject-
auxiliary inversion is acquired early (or, indeed, is innate), errors are relatively common among learners 
of English. […] Most common are non-inversion (or uninversion) errors (e.g. *What she can eat? […] 
where the auxiliary appears in post-subject position. Various types of auxiliary-doubling errors are also 
observed, particularly for negative questions (e.g. *What does she doesn’t like?) […]  
Under constructivist approaches, questions are not formed by movement. Rather, questions are 
independent constructions and undergo the same acquisition process as any other: children begin with 
rote-learned holophrases (e.g. What is he doing?; What is he eating?) and gradually schematize across 
these to form low-level lexically specific slot-and-frame-patterns (e.g. What is [THING] [PROCESS]?). 
Finally, children analogize across these schemas (or instances of these schemas in the form of actual 
utterances) to yield fully abstract constructions (e.g. Wh-word AUX SUBJECT VERB?). 
The prediction of this account is that children will show effects of lexical-specificity: they will show 
good performance with question that can be formed using a well-learned schema, but poor performance 
for questions where a ready-made schema is unavailable and a more creative strategy is acquired. […] 
Rowland and Pine (2000: 164) argue that ‘the child lexically specific knowledge is likely to centre round 
wh-word + auxiliary combinations, rather than auxiliary + subject combinations’ [apparently, 
completive rather than oriented questions]. This is because the range of wh-words and auxiliaries is 
relatively narrow (perhaps especially in speech to young children),  whereas the range of subjects is 
potentially infinite.” (Ambridge, Lieven, 2011). 
Concluding their paragraphs about the acquisition of questions, Ambridge and Lieven propose some 
solutions for both the generativist approach and the constructivist one, such as “to posit some role for 
lexical learning” in the first case, or to specify “the precise nature of the early schemas themselves”, “to 
explain precisely how children move from lexically-specific construction schemas to a fully abstract wh-
question construction”.  
Evidently, such an interesting “theoretical contrasting” should be developed not only about English as 
an object-language, but also about highly typologically differentiated languages.  
2 The skill of asking questions seems typical of humans and cannot be learned by primates, not even by 
those who were trained to learn human languages: see  Jordania (2006). 
3 See, among others, Gobber, 1999, Weber 1993. 
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('who'), a thing ('what'), a time (‘when’), a place (‘where’), or a reason (‘why’), according to 
the typical pronominal or adverbial heads of interrogative phrases. 
The purpose of oriented questions is to ascertain the truth or falsity of a statement, or at least 
to make explicit the assent or dissent given by the addressee to the state of affairs under 
question. 
Both completive and oriented questions belong to the so-called “closed” questions, because 
the task given to the answerer is a rather quick and delimited one. Alternatively, “open” 
questions are those which cannot be answered in a way correspondent to the structure of 
the question, i.e. just confirming or disconfirming the set-up orientation, or by just 
completing the missing constituent. Open questions are those which require an active and 
long-lasting cooperation by the addressee: the task of answering has to be articulated step 
by step, and it is not excluded that the goal of a definite answer cannot be achieved. Some 
well-known or lesser known questions remain open for a long time, even for centuries4. 
2.4 A larger scale: questions vs. requests  
Beyond these two classes of questions another kind of speech acts needs to be recalled: that 
of requests. Latin distinguished these two acts at a lexical level: while petere means “to ask” 
for knowledge, quaerere means “to ask” in order to obtain something. ‘Queries’ may just be 
questions asked in order to obtain/retrieve information. 
The distinction between questions and requests always deserves to be taken into 
consideration, in order to avoid that “intellectualistic” or theoreticist attitude, according to 
which we just speak for the sake of knowledge. As Austin claimed, with words we do 
things.  Nevertheless we have to bear in mind that sometimes we ask questions instead of 
requiring something, accomplishing a so-called indirect speech act: e.g., when we ask  “are 
you getting down at the next stop?”, when we need to get past to get off the bus. 
This whole family of speech acts (asking questions, making requests etc.) was already 
included by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations5 among the (almost innumerable) 
language games which he claimed needed to be taken into consideration without restricting 
one’s attention to declarative sentences.  
It was quite probably “the first” Wittgenstein, i.e. the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, that Austin had especially (but not exclusively) in mind when he reminded 
philosophers of the descriptive fallacy. “Grammarians, indeed”, - Austin admitted – “have 
regularly pointed out that not all ‘sentences’ are [used in making] statements: there are, 
traditionally, besides (grammarians’) statements, also questions and exclamations, and 
sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions “ (Austin, 1962). In any case, the 
difficult balance between assertiveness and its counterparts deserves to be put in evidence 
much earlier, in the roots of Western philosophical tradition. After Plato’s sympathetic 
witnessing of Socrates’ midwifing ability, with its connected erotetic method (the art of 
asking questions), a whole tradition came down to us, according to which apophantic 
speech only (the term is Aristotelic: declaratory) had to be considered in logic. Questions, 
                                                 
4 http://www.openquestions.com/ 
5 §§ 21-23. 
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being neither true nor false, disappeared from the philosophical investigations for a long 
time.  
This happened in spite of the role assigned by Aristoteles himself to wonder: “For it is 
owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they 
wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated 
difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the 
sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe” (Metaphysics, Book I).  
A pioneer’s exception in introducing questions in logic was Richard Whately’s Elements of 
Logic  (1826), which included erotetic logic (see now Brozek, 2011), i.e. the logic of questioning. 
“Every Argument” – he writes – “consists of two parts; that which is proved; and that by means 
of which it is proved: the former is called, before it is proved, the question; when proved, the 
conclusion (or inference)” (Whately, 1826). Thus questions move inferential activity. 
Furthermore, Whately devotes two chapters of his work to introducing proper distinctions, the 
ignorance of which produces “undetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Logomachy”. 
Such distinctions – warns Whately - allow us to avoid confusion between Verbal and Real 
Questions. “For to trace any error to its source, will often throw more light on the subject in 
hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with merely detecting and refuting it.”(ibid.). 
Such was his reply to George Cambell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), where he had 
“maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal controversy alone”. 
Evidently Whately intended to sweep away those controversies which are merely verbal, in 
order to deal just with those which are genuine, real ones. 
He states: “Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question whether a certain Predicate is 
or is not applicable to a certain subject, or what Predicate is applicable […]. But sometimes 
the Question turns on the meaning and extent of the terms employed; sometimes on the 
things signified by them. If it be made to appear, therefore, that the opposite sides of a 
certain Question may be held by persons not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, 
then that Question may be pronounced Verbal; as depending on the different senses in 
which they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ 
the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, 
then it may be pronounced that the Question is Real, that they differ as to the opinions they 
hold of the things in Question. […] It is by no means to be supposed that all Verbal 
Questions are trifling and frivolous; it is often of the highest importance to settle correctly 
the meaning of a word, either according to ordinary use, or according to the meaning of any 
particular writer, or class of men; but when Verbal Questions are mistaken for Real, much 
confusion of thought and unprofitable wrangling will be generally the result. […] It is 
evidently of much importance to keep in mind the above distinctions, in order to avoid, on 
the one hand, stigmatizing as Verbal controversies, what in reality are not such, merely 
because the Question turns on the applicability of a certain Predicate to a certain subject; or, 
on the other hand, falling into the opposite error of mistaking words for things, and judging 
of men’s agreement or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely from their agreement 
or disagreement in the terms employed.” (Whately, 1826). 
2.5 Performing questions / queries and formalising them 
This connection between judgement and agreement should lead to overcoming the threshold 
that divides the theoretical and practical sides involved in our subject, questions and queries. 
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Indeed, Austin plays an important role in opening6 new paths to pragmatics, identifying the 
character of questions, promises and the like.   
“To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an 
illocutionary act, as I propose to call it. To determine what illocutionary act is so performed 
we must determine in what way we are using the locution: asking or answering a 
question […] When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech: but in what way 
precisely are we using it on this occasion? […] These issues penetrate a little but not 
without confusion into grammar […], but we constantly do debate them, in such terms as 
whether certain words (a certain locution) had the force of a question, or ought to have been 
taken as an estimate and so on. […] I shall refer to […] the doctrine of ‘illocutionary 
forces’” (Austin, 1962).  
It was few years later, in 1969, that John Searle published Speech Acts. In the very first pages 
it was stated:  “The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, 
the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather  
the production or issuance of the symbol, word or sentence in the performance of the speech 
act.” (Searle, 1969).  “ The general form of (many kinds of) illocutionary acts is  
F (p) 
where the variable “F” takes illocutionary force indicating devices as values and “p” takes 
expressions for propositions. We can symbolize different kinds of illocutionary acts in the 
form, e.g.,  
├ (p) for assertions    ! (p) for requests 
 Pr  (p) for promises    W (p) for warnings 
   ? (p) for yes – no questions 
and so on. Except for yes-no questions the symbolism for questions must represent 
propositional functions and not complete proposition, because except in yes –no questions 
the speaker asking a question does not express a complete proposition. Thus, “How many 
people were at the party?” is represented as  
? (X number of people were at the party) 
“Why did he do it?” is represented as 
                                                 
6 For truth’s sake, the evaluation about who opens what is the result of a historical judgement. To be 
well informed and impartial, the historians of culture and ideas should open their views towards the 
global scene: what happens, on the contrary, is too often that different kinds of barriers (linguistic, 
ideological, due to mutually ignored traditions and so on) forbid such a world-wide view. On our 
specific subject, a widespread mistake or simply a naiveté is to take the deep and well-known unity of 
pragmatics belonging to the English-speaking world of analytic philosophy as the very first trend in 
metalinguistic thought overcoming the gap between theoretic and pragmatic approach, viewing the 
speaking activity as related not only to the domain of knowledge, but also to that of action. Just 
confining ourselves to the Western/Central European situation, we shouldn’t ignore the old and large 
stream of German-speaking scholars, who however do not belong to/create an actual common school, 
such as Bernard Bolzano, Gottlob Frege, Alexius Meinong. They all well understood that questions do 
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? (He did it because …) 
But “Did you do it?”, a yes –no question, is represented as  
? (You did it) 
In so far as we confine our discussion to simple subject predicate propositions, with a 
singular definite referring term as subject, we can represent the distinctions in the form 
F (RP) 
“R” for the referring expression and the capital P for the predicating expression.” (Searle, 
1969, as the following table).  
 
  Request Question 
 Propositional 
Content 
Future act A of H Any proposition or propositional 
function 
 Preparatory 1. H is able to do A. S believes H
is able to do A. 
2. It is not obvious to both S and 
H that H will do A in the 
normal course of events of his 
own accord. 
1. S does not know “the answer”, 
i.e., does not know if the 
proposition is true, or, in the 
case of the propositional 
function, does not know the 
information needed to 
complete the proposition truly 
(but see comment below). 
2. It is not obvious to both  S and 
H that H will provide the 
information at that time 




Sincerity S wants H to do A. S wants this information. 
 Essential Counts as an attempt to get H to do A. Counts as an attempt to elicit this 
information from H. 
 Comment Order and command have the additional 
preparatory rule that S must be in a 
position of authority over H.  
Command probably does not have the 
‘pragmatic’ condition requiring non-
obviousness. Furthermore in both, the 
authority relationship infects the 
essential condition because the 
utterance counts as an attempt to get H
to do A in virtue of the authority of S over 
H. 
There are two kind of questions (a) real 
questions, (b) exam questions. In real 
questions S wants to know (find out) 
the answer; in exam questions, S wants 
to know if H knows. 
Table 1. Types of illocutionary act. 
                                                 
7 A further preparatory rule should be: “S believes that H knows ‘the answer’, i.e. if the proposition is 
true or, in case of propositional function, the element needed to complete the proposition truly”. I owe 
the suggestion of this addition to Aldo Frigerio.  
www.intechopen.com
 
Semantics – Advances in Theories and Mathematical Models 
 
54
In 1985 Searle and Vanderveken publish Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Questions are, 
once more, mentioned among speech acts considered as illocutionary acts. Therefore 
questions too consist of an illocutionary force F and a propositional content P. Illocutionary 
logic aims to formalize the logical properties of illocutionary forces. In the case of questions, 
the authors consider requests and asks within the class of English directives.  
According to the meanings attributed to the occurring symbols8,  definitions of ‘request’ and 
‘ask’ are as follows:  
“request (!) 
A request is a directive illocution that allows for the possibility of refusal. A request can be 
granted or refused by the hearer. Thus ║request║ differs from ║direct ║only by the fact that 
mode (║request║) (i, P) = I iff i ∏෡ ! P and the speaker in i allows the hearer the possibility of 
refusing to carry out the future course of action represented by P. “Request” is the 
paradigmatic directive verb, but since it is special in having a rather polite mode of 
achievement of its illocutionary point, it cannot be taken as the primitive directive. 
ask. 
“Ask” has two quite distinct uses. One is in the notion of asking a question and the second is 
in the notion of asking someone to do something. Questions are always directives, for they 
are attempts to get the hearer to perform a speech act. In the simple directive sense, “ask” 
names the same illocutionary force as “request”. In the sense of “ask a question” it means 
request that the hearer perform a speech act to the speaker, the form of which is already 
determined by the propositional content of the question. Thus if the question is a yes-no 
question requesting an assertive, the speaker expresses the propositional content of the 
answer in asking the question; and all that the hearer is asked to do is affirm or deny that 
propositional content. For example, to ask someone whether it is raining is to request him to 
perform a true assertion with the propositional content that it is or that it is not raining. 
The illocutionary force of the illocutionary act that is requested to be performed in case of 
asking a question is not necessarily assertive. When the minister in the wedding chapel asks 
“Do you take this woman to be your lawful wedded wife?”, he is asking for a response 
                                                 
8 ║ ║ is the function that assigns to each illocutionary verb the force or type of speech act that it names;  
i is a variable for possible contexts of utterance;  
P is a variable for propositions; ∏෡  names a relation between contexts of utterance and propositions that determines the condition of 
commitment to illocutionary point ∏; 
I names the integer one or the truth value: truth, or the success value : success; ∈ is	the	sign	of	membership; 
Prop names the set of all propositions; 
A  is a variable for illocutionary acts; 
bi is a variable for hearers; 
ai is a variable for speakers; it names the speaker of context of utterance i; 
t is a variable for moments of time; 
l  is a variable for places of utterance;  
w is a variable for possible words Prop ║ask║ (i) is the set of all propositions which respect the conditions imposed by the illocutionary 
force ║ask║on the propositional content P in a context i. 
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(“Yes I do”, or “No I do not”) that is a declaration and not an assertion. Thus ║ask║ (in the 
simple directive sense) = ║request║ and ║ask?║in the sense of yes-no question differs from 
║direct║ only by the fact that P ∈ Prop ║ask║ (i) iff, for some illocution A , P (w) = I iff for 
some t  > ti , A is performed in < bi, ai, t, l,  w >. 
In wh-questions the form of the question contains a propositional function, and the hearer is 
requested to fill in a value of the free variable in the propositional function in such a way as 
to produce a true complete proposition. Thus, for example, the question “How many people 
went to the party?” is of the form “I request you, you tell me the correct value of x in ‘x 
number of people went to the party’.” A full characterization of the logical form of wh-
questions cannot be made in this study, because it would require the definition of the 
notions of a property, a relation and an elementary proposition, all of which are part of first 
order illocutionary logic.” (Searle, Vanderveken, 1985).  
2.6 Triggers  
Sometimes old mythology helps to show simply and synthetically the deep roots – the 
foundations – of what technical treatments of ever-green topics just foreshadow. 
If we read Plato’s Symposion, we find the story told by Diotima to Socrates about the birth 
of Eros (love) from Poros (ΠόǒοǓ, "resource" or "plenty") and Penia (Πενία, poverty).9 
According to Plato, love “is also a philosopher: or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of 
wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant.”  
This tale can serve as a helpful hint to understand the formal affinity between indefinite and 
interrogative adjectives/pronouns: constantly related throughout typologically different 
languages10. 
What does this structural similarity mean? It underlines the strong relationship between 
lack of determinacy (poverty) and the need to overcome it (in order to attain plentifulness). 
If somebody is not able to determine, to define something, s/he is in a position of having to 
ask somebody else to fill this gap. To be in this position does not necessarily imply acting 
upon it, adopting those decisions, using those devices where triggers such as  wh-words are 
at work for retrieving missing information, for extracting knowledge, mining data or for 
receiving the cooperation requested.  
                                                 
9 "What then is Love?" I asked; "Is he mortal?" "No." "What then?" "As in the former instance, he is 
neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two." "What is he, Diotima?" "He is a great 
spirit (daimon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal." "And what," I 
said, "is his power?" "He interprets," she replied, "between gods and men, conveying and taking across 
to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is 
the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and therefore in him all is bound together, and 
through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all, 
prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the 
intercourse, and converse of god with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which 
understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. 
Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love. "And who," I 
said, "was his father, and who his mother?" "The tale," she said, "will take time; nevertheless I will tell 
you…” The tale can be read in The Internet Classics Archive:  
http://classics.mit.edu//Plato/symposium.html. 
10 http://wals.info/chapter/46  
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We are all familiar with the expression “to break the ice”. To ask proper questions at the 
right moment may be a good way to break the ice. But sometimes it is so difficult to detect 
the extension and the boundaries of what we ignore that no questions arise, whereas at 
some other times correct, precise, punctual questions addressed to the right addressee at the 
right moment can pave the way to quite important self-disclosures, intelligent and far-
seeing insights, real turning points. The quality of interviews and interrogatories depends 
on the skills of their authors and on the cooperation they are able to gain. 
There are crucial structures which are capable of  building answers, as well as questions and 
requests. These structures are the strategic means to order words syntactically and 
semantically, in a way which is suitable for “filling” the gaps (of knowledge/action) 
identified by questions/requests; strategic insofar as they themselves are non-saturated 
tools, unaccomplished structures, and yet still able to activate accomplishments, and form a 
bridge to the expected items.  
Predication is such a structure, propositional functions are its developments on the way 
towards complete propositions.  
3. The structure of an answer 
3.1 From interrogative/indefinite items to definite references 
Basically, an answer looks like an assertion (affirmative or negative) or a consent / refusal, 
perhaps accompanied by the requested action or even converted into it, without words. It 
depends on the trigger, whether a question or a request11. 
According to Paul Grice, in order for our wording to be effective, our interaction with one 
another has to follow the “cooperative principle”: "make your contribution such as it is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged." 
To complement a question or a request means, therefore, to replace indefiniteness with 
definiteness, thanks to the force appointed to an item to be fulfilled or to the 
confirmation/disconfirmation of the suspended orientation included.   
Too often these alternative possibilities have been replaced in the metalinguistic 
representation by an oversimplification, i.e. by the reduction of answers to judgements, 
because of the importance of truth values. 
Our choice here, however, is whatever the reply is, to consider its core, or rather the 
condition of the possibility not only of answers but of queries too; that is to say predication 
and the structure it involves. 
Generally speaking, predicates are conceived as terms of a relation, the output of the act of 
saying something about something else, of attributing (or applying) something to something 
                                                 
11 Nevertheless, we have to consider this distinction not as a clear-cut one: indeed with the notion of 
indirect speech act Searle  recalls that “for example, a speaker may utter the sentence Can you reach the 
salt? and mean it not merely as a question but as a request to pass the salt […], cases in which one 
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another.” (Searle, 1975) 
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else, as expressions of properties or relations belonging to one or more objects, or the result 
of making concepts fall into one another. 
Actually, in logical-grammatical training, we meet predicates first. Predication as such 
remains in the background. On the contrary, it is consistent with a pragmatic framework to 
put the act first and its result afterwards. 
Our claim is that without predication we cannot ensure neither the right assessment of the 
interrogative items in questions (where wh-placeholders need to be substituted and their 
empty place filled), nor the nuclear structure upon which the illocutionary force of the 
answers can be exerted. 
Moreover, we think that while underlining predication as a main device, at the same time 
we show answers as works in progress, towards the identification of definite references or 
events, or towards the definition of a yes- or no-answer. In fact, if we consider that, 
according to a certain semantic paradigm (the Fregean and the Neo-fregean one), truth 
values are the referents of assertions, we can say that predication allows answers to gain 
reference both locally and globally (at the level of single constituents and at the level of 
whole sentences, if assertive, as such).  
Once the primacy of the act of predication upon predicates and consequently upon 
predication as a result is stated (words like predic-ation always work both as a nomen actionis 
and as a nomen rei actae), we can proceed as follows:  
 first we will treat predication as the basic syntagmatic act,  
 then we will see its correlates and  
 eventually we will consider the whole structure it builds, from the point of view of the 
two main paradigms according to which such a structure has been conceived, the 
Aristotelian and the Fregean one. 
3.2 The basic syntagmatic act is predication 
Let us consider the etymology of ‘predicate’, in English a noun with exactly the same form 
as the verb (but in the infinitive,  not participle mood). Why is this so? According to the 
reconstruction offered by the Oxford English Dictionary ‘predicate’ comes from “Middle 
French predicat (French prédicat ) that which is said of a subject (1370), quality (1466) and its 
etymon post-classical Latin praedicatum12 that which is said of a subject (6th cent. in 
Boethius; earlier in senses doctrine, precept (4th cent.), prediction (late 2nd or early 3rd cent. 
in Tertullian), use as noun of neuter past participle of classical Latin praedicāre. ‘’.   
Therefore, if somebody predicates something of something else or of somebody else, then 
we obtain predicates. We can sum up the whole scene as a predication. Why do I underline 
such an obvious remark? Because sometimes this “ontogenetic”, dynamic reconstruction has 
been forgotten, leaving as a result the static relation between predicates and their correlates 
as ready-made. 
                                                 
12 Gr. kategoroúmenon, from kategoréo, a typical expression recalling the agorà in the polis, and its role of 
attracting citizens called to select (katà, in front of everybody, publicly) candidates submitted to public 
evaluation for the future governance of the polis itself. 
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Beyond this, what was the result of an operation of junction and construction has been 
considered to be something already given, to be analysed, resolved into its parts. This is 
why traditionally we became acquainted with the practise of grammatical analysis 
centred upon the parts of speech (the whole, i.e. the speech, remaining almost 
completely out of systematic consideration), and with the practice of logical analysis 
centred upon logical terms (literally, ends of the proposition: see predicate calculus), 
rather than upon the unity of proposition itself and of propositions with each other 
(propositional calculus).  
Moreover, the two analyses tended towards reciprocal emancipation: instead of a systematic 
correlation among forms and functions, a frequent matter was that of the “liberation” or 
“emancipation” of  grammar from the yoke of logic and of logic from the yoke of 
grammar13. 
This caused some confusions and worry throughout long history of Western logic and 
philosophy. 
It would be useful, to begin with, to recall that some technical terms on the matter could 
work, as predication, both as nomina actionis and as nomina rei actae, such as articulation, 
proposition and function. Similarly, not only predicate, but also subject come from Latin 
praedicatum and subjectum, in their turn translations of the past and passive Greek participles 
kategoroumenon and hypokeimenon: the first one a real passive form, the latter an interesting 
deponent.  
But what could be seen “on the run” was, and still is, rather considered as an achieved 
goal. 
Two independent developments in the 20th century helped to change this point of view, in 
linguistics as well as in philosophy, the first, functionalism in classical structuralism and the 
second, pragmatics in analytical philosophy.  
“The basic syntagmatic act, and at the same time the intrinsic sentence-forming act, is the 
predication”, states the second of the 1929 theses of the Prague Linguistic Circle (Vachek 
1983). Behind the collective authorship of that text, there was one particular author, Vilém 
Mathesius, the founder of the Circle, with his syntactical investigations14.  In 1926 he wrote: 
                                                 
13 See (Sériot, Samain, 2008), with a precious extension of the status quaestionis to Eastern European and 
Russian studies.  
14 Although being a detail in the huge panorama here sketchily outlined, it is worth mentioning the 
particular approach developed by Mathesius himself and by a Swedish Anglicist he quotes as well, K.F. 
Sundén, in the previous decades (Sundén 1904, 1916) : they both ended up researching “sentencehood” 
through predication, and elliptical predication especially, i.e. through effective, though reduced 
structures, deviating from the canonical  bi-member sentences, yet recognisable and understandable as 
true sentences only via a cooperative  inference of the addressee, who had to capture specific semantic 
intentions orienting each act of predication. Sundén (1916) begins his essay The Predicational Categories in 
English thus: “It is a matter of general observation that the connexion between subject and predicate 
may from a semological point of view be of different kinds. We are not then alluding to the particular 
and accidental relation brought about by the different tenses, moods or tense-aspects of the predicate, 
but to the general qualification of the subject conditioned by the material import of the predicate itself. 
In other words, we are referring to the different manners in which the predicate qualifies the subject. It 
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“A full analysis of the basic grammatical function – e.g. the function of the subject and 
predication, […] the real nature of sentence formation – can be achieved only with the help of 
the static [not genetically comparative] method by which linguistic phenomena are not 
unduly separated from the action of speaking. […] In the field of syntax the general shift of 
interest from the external aspect of language to its inner life is exemplified by the emphasizing 
of the stylistic principle and by the substitution of the functional conception for the 
traditional formal point of view. Finer methods of linguistic analysis have brought to light 
the importance of what I should call the double-faced character of linguistic phenomena. It 
consists [of] a continuous fluctuation between the general and the individual. […] Linguistic 
research can either concentrate on what has already become a common possession of all 
members of the linguistic community or it can study the individual efforts of linguistic 
creation. The traditional school of linguistics has so exclusively limited itself to the study of 
commonly accepted means of expression that the individual speaker has disappeared from 
its ken. As a reaction against this too objective conception of language, a school of an 
extreme linguistic subjectivism chiefly represented by Professor K. Vossler has appeared, 
which following the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Benedetto Croce regards the act of 
linguistic expression as something [as] individual as artistic creation. […] The proposition 
maintained by Professor Spitzer ‘Nihil est in syntaxi quod non fuerit in stylo’ very clearly 
shows how the greatest stress is laid by him and his friends on the individual share in 
linguistic expression. Linguistics as a whole can derive from stylistic syntax and stylistic 
semasiology a double benefit. [But, Mathesius replies,] It is good that the rule, often 
neglected, has been emphasized again […] In the study of language, of course, individual 
utterances are analysed as specimens of the linguistic possibilities of the whole 
community… . The time has really come for general linguistic problems to be systematically 
studied. […] The basic functions of linguistic expression should be analysed and the means 
of linguistic expression catalogued. This means showing how in all kinds of languages the 
subject and the predicate are expressed, which are the possible forms of the active, passive, 
perceptive, qualificative, possessive, etc. predication, how the attributive qualification is 
expressed, which aspects of activity or of status can be expressed in the predication, etc. It is self-
evident that such problems cannot be solved but by the functional and static [i.e. synchronic, 
as opposed to diachronic] method of research.” (Mathesius, 1926; italics mine). 
                                                                                                                            
is this difference that should be the leading principle for a classification of the predicative connexions 
[…]  or for short ‘predication’. […] Thus ‘connexion’ is meant to denote one of the two principal 
categories of combination of morphemes that occur in language [‘connexion’, term employed by 
Noreen, on the whole corresponding to Wundt’s ‘geschlossene Wortgruppe’, as implies that a principal 
and an accessory element are being combined, in this case equivalent to a subject and a predicate, in 
contradistinction to ‘adjunctive (adjundct) connexion’ (Wundt’s ‘offene Wortverbindung’, that implies a 
combination already made between a principal and an accessory member, in this case a determinatum 
and a determinandum: the laughing child vs. the child is laughing], the other [combination] being called 
‘adhexion’, in which the members combined are independent of each other, e.g. ‘You and I’; ‘he is 
reading, but she is writing’.  
A distinction of the different kinds of predicative connexion as met with in Indo-European languages, 
has not yet been instituted by current grammar. This neglect renders it difficult, may impossible to deal 
properly with the predicational changes  of verbs […] It is indispensable to make this classification if we 
want to view the verbal changes of meaning we are going to deal with [the phenomenon of transitive 
verbs used in English as predicate-verbs in the active form with a passive sense: close (of a flower), 
conjoin (of roots), divide (of a shell)], in the light of their predicational functions.” 
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In a nutshell, syntagmatic acts precede syntax as composition precedes its metalinguistic 
analysis15.  
With a strong similarity, in his Speech Acts John Searle identifies predication and reference 
within the level of expressions, before inquiring into their meaning and their being speech 
acts. He states:  “… in the utterance […] a speaker is characteristically performing at least 
three distinct kinds of acts:  (a) the uttering of words (morphemes, sentences); (b) referring 
and predicating;  c) stating, questioning, commanding, promising etc. 
Let us assign names to these under the general heading of speech acts:  
a. uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts. 
b. referring and predicating = performing propositional acts. 
c. stating, questioning, commanding, promising etc. = performing illocutionary acts. 
[…] The distinction between reference and predication holds, and the correct description is 
to say that the predicate expression is used to ascribe a property. I do not claim that this 
description has any explanatory power at all. Nobody who does not already have a prior 
understanding of what it is to use a predicate expression can understand this remark […] At 
this stage I only claim that it is literally true […] (Searle 1969). 
Essentially, summing up cause and effect, act and result has to be done not only for the sake 
of completeness, but also on the assumption that linguistic structures and their semantics 
largely underdetermine their meanings and the meaning of their relations, which are often 
defined by the context in which they occur16. In other words: predicates are not prefab, they 
are just semi-processed products. They need to be determined within the sentences they 
belong to, and further assigned to the utterances they are constituents of. 
Now that this primacy of predication upon predicates (so to speak) has been grasped, let us 
move on to the two main models about predicates, that of Aristotle and that of Frege17. 
Before sketching an essential outline of their doctrines, it is worth noting the wide influence 
of models, especially the Aristotelian one, with which not only philosophers became (and 
still become) acquainted, but also ordinary people, usually young pupils during their first 
years of school. 
3.3 Predicates and their correlates, or the sentence as a unit 
Predication is the act of predicating (saying) something about something else. So we have, in 
nuce, the legitimate expectancy of a second term of relation, of the predicative relation: what 
is predicated about. 
                                                 
15 On this very point, of the border between generality and individuality, ten years later Mathesius 
stated:  “The sentence is not entirely the product of a transitory moment, is not entirely determined by 
the individual situation, and, consequently, does not entirely belong to the sphere of speech, but 
depends in its general form on the grammatical system of the language in which it is uttered. […] In 
language we have the word in its conceptual meaning and the sentence as abstract pattern, whereas in 
speech we have the word as referring to concrete reality and the sentence as concrete utterance.” 
(Mathesius 1936). See (Raynaud, 2008). 
16 See (Frigerio, 2010 a), (Frigerio, 2010 b). 
17 The eminency of Aristotle’s and Frege’s contributions throughout the whole history of logic are 
widely recognised: see  (Dummett, 1973).  
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Nearly everybody would label this second term of relation ‘subject’, due to a more than bi-
millenarian tradition: a really successful transmission of high culture (Aristotelian logic) to 
basic education, passed down from the school-teaching of ancient languages to that of 
modern ones, without so much as a blink.  
This so well-known schema has induced and still induces another apparently obvious 
expectancy: that predication involves a two-element structure, be it a question or an answer, 
or whatever. 
Rather than a relation, this should grant a correlation: if P, then C (= Correlate to P). 
Immediately after, or even simultaneously, a further if-then (→) prevision: if P, then S (= 
Subject). 
But even the briefest glance at real conversations, texts, or messages of any sort would 
contradict such a prevision, a prevision to be contradicted in many ways, upwards and 
downwards. Sometimes only one element is enough, sometimes even five or six constituents 
take place. What has to be corrected? The idea of a correlation to be expected? Its structure 
as a regular two-element structure? Its epistemological status as a regulative ideal instead of 
a statistical regularity? 
Let us proceed step by step.  
Firstly:  
The expectancy of a correlation is a legitimate one; on one condition however, that of 
recognising it as a regulative ideal only. This means that we cannot take for granted that in 
each sentence we will find such an evident correlation. We have elliptical sentences, 
condensed utterances, such as ‘Why?’, ‘What?’, ‘Fire!’, ‘Come!’ ‘Yes.’, ‘No’. Sometimes the 
predicate is absent  /cut off because it is the same as in the previous sentence, sometimes it 
is present but includes the person it refers to, sometimes just an adverb of affirmation or 
negation is sufficient to substitute the whole predicative correlation. In any case the 
correlation seems, though not always , to be active. 
But is the predicative relation always a relation to one element (typically the subject), i.e. a 
monadic relation?  
The short (though not careless) answer should be: what is necessary is the unity of the 
sentence (query or answer), whether the unity be simple or complex.   
If we look for a classical image suggesting the idea of one thing being able to look like (and 
also function as) two, we should recall the image of an elbow or of a knee: being part of an 
arm or leg does not prevent them articulating the movement of their own limbs. As 
demonstrated, this basic biological image supports the concept of articulation, an ancient and 
evergreen metalinguistic tool (Laspia, 1997). 
Such a deep feeling of the original and fundamental unit of any sentence (in this case, 
specifically, and especially, queries and answers), and, at the same time, of the dynamic role 
of predication in the sentence, is well attested to by nearly all of the major authors , those 
who represent real milestones along the path of metalinguistic thought, such as Aristotle, 
Humboldt, Frege, Peirce, Bühler and Tesnière, to mention some of the most eminent. 
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Nevertheless, the tone with which this eminent choir has sung throughout the centuries 
deserves our careful attention. 
Let us begin with Aristotle’s insistence upon the “equivalence” between a noun and a 
definition (Laspia, 2005), expressed through a judgement of identity:   
“Since definition [horismòs ] means ‘an account [lógos ] of what a thing is’, obviously one 
kind of definition will be an explanation [lógos ] of the meaning of the name, or of an 
equivalent denomination [e logos héteros onomatódes  ]” (Analytica posteriora B 10, 93 b 29-31).  
“The starting-point is from definition; and definition results from the necessity of […] 
meaning something; because the formula, which […] term implies, will be a definition.” 
(Metaphysica Γ 7, 1012 a 23-4). 
A reading of the whole dialogue “The Sophist” would be helpful in revealing the reasons 
why nouns and verbs came on to the philosophical scene: they actually fulfill the 
requirements of those who seek to discern truth from falsity, or rather of those who contrast 
the thesis of the indiscernibility of truth and falsity. From this point of view Plato and 
Aristotle are much closer to each other than usually thought. “Discourse is never composed 
of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns. […] For instance, 
‘walks’, ‘runs’, ‘sleeps’ and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there 
are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that. No, - replies Theaethetus to the 
Stranger – of course not. And again, when ‘lion’, ‘stag’, ‘horse’, and all other names of those 
who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make 
discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of 
anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the 
words fit, and their first combination [symploké] is a sentence, about the first and shortest 
form of discourse.[…] When one says ‘a man learns’ […] he does not merely gives names, 
but he reaches a conclusion by combining (symplékon) verbs with nouns. […] So, then, just as 
of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some 
of them do fit and form discourse (lógos).” (Plato Sophista 261 d - 262 e) 
“Verbs by themselves, then, are nouns, and they stand for or signify something, for the 
speaker stops his process of thinking and the mind of the hearer acquiesces. However, they 
do not as yet express positive or negative judgements. […] A sentence is significant speech, 
of which this or that part may have meaning – as something, that is, that is uttered but not 
as expressing a judgement of a positive or negative character. […] But while every sentence 
has meaning, […] not all can be called propositions.” (De interpretatione 3, 16 b 22-5; 4, 16 b 
27-29; 4, 17 a 1-4).  
Although not all sentences prove to be units as in the case of a definition, Aristotle 
nevertheless explains what, in each case, keeps the noun and the verb together, the subject 
and the predicate: it is the verb ‘to be’, which paraphrases the relating function of the verb: 
“The two propositions, ‘man walks’, ‘man is walking’ mean just the same thing. “(De 
interpretatione 12, 21 b 9-10) 
The term ‘copula’, although first introduced only in the XIIth century, by Abelard, and 
therefore not originally Aristotelian, with its huge diffusion, testifies to the “popularity” of 
the Aristotelian model.  
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We have already mentioned the objection of descriptive fallacy (§ 2.2) which can be recalled 
as important due to the reductionism of the proposed formalisation: S is P18 . 
Less attracted by the referential and defining purport of speech and more focused on its 
building dynamics is Humboldt’s view.  
Perhaps it would be worth mentioning the subjectivist turn (not yet about sentences, but 
rather concerning nouns and verbs) taken in the modern era and testified to by Arnauld and 
Lancelot’s Grammaire générale et raisonnée,: “The subject of our thoughts, are either things, 
such as the earth, the sun, water, wood, what we normally call substance. Or the way things 
are; like being round, being red, being hard, being wise etc. what we call accidents. […] 
Because those [the words] which refer to substance, are called “substantive nouns or 
names”; and those which refer to attributes, signalling the subject to which these attributes 
pertain, adjectival nouns. 
And that is the origin of substantive and adjectival nouns. But we didn't stop there: and it so 
happens that we didn't so much stop at meaning [signification], but rather at the manner of 
meaning [manière de signifier]. Because the substance is what exists in its own right, we have 
given the name substantive nouns to all those which exist by themselves in the discourse, 
without needing any other name, even if they signify accidents. […] The verb itself should 
have no other use than to signify the link that we make in our minds between the two terms 
of the proposition. But there is only the verb “to be” which we call substantive which has 
this simplicity, we can even say that it only has this simplicity in the third person of the 
present tense, “is” and in certain contexts.”(Arnauld-Lancelot, 1660; italics, beyond 
examples and technical terms, are mine). 
The reflexion on language takes its leave of an insurmountable correspondence between 
linguistic and world structures. The shape of speech –as is now accepted - depends largely 
on the activity of speakers. Wilhelm von Humboldt, after a life-long and world-wide 
empirical research on languages, sums up his theoretical views with great efficacy:  
“Framing the sentence. The grammatically formed word […] in the composition of its 
elements, and in its unity as a whole, is destined to enter, again as an element, into the 
sentence. So language must here form, higher unity – higher, not merely because it is of 
greater extent, but also because it depends more exclusively on the ordering inner form of 
the sense of language, in that sound can only operate on it an auxiliary fashion. […] If we 
start from the sentence, as is originally more correct, since every utterance, however incomplete, does 
really constitute a closed thought in the speaker’s mind, then languages which employ this 
method [as the Mexican] by no means shatter the unity of the sentence, but try, rather, to 
knit its construction even more tightly together. But they manifestly derange the boundaries 
of verbal unity by carrying them over into the domain of sentential unity. […] The Mexican 
method of incorporation testifies in this to a correct sense of sentence-formation, that it 
attaches the designation of its relations precisely to the verb, and thus to the point at which 
the sentence ties itself together into unity. […] 
                                                 
18 While attending corpus linguistics studies, I was prompted to reconsider the role of predication in the 
vast field of illocutionary forces and in relation to a variety of objects. It was a rather shocking 
experience, similar to that of going out in the open air rather than contemplating a panorama  from a 
single window.   
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Sound forms and grammatical requirements. Grammatical formation arises from the laws of 
thinking in language, and rests on the congruence of sound-forms with the latter. […] But 
deficiency on the one point always reacts back at once upon the other. The perfecting of 
language demands that every word be stamped as a specific part of speech, and carry within 
it those properties that a philosophical analysis perceives therein. It thus itself presupposes 
inflection. So the question now is as to how the simplest part of completed language 
formation, the minting of a word by inflection into a part of speech, can be supposed to 
proceed within the mind of a people? Reflective consciousness of the language cannot be 
presumed in connection with its origin, and would also harbour no creative power for the 
forming of sounds. Every advantage that a language possesses in this truly vital portion of 
its organism proceeds originally from the living sensory world-outlook. […] An intuition 
proceeding from the liveliest and most harmonious exertion of powers exhausts everything 
presented in the intuited, and does not confound the particular, but separates it out in 
clarity. Now from recognition of this dual relation of objects, from the feeling of their right 
relationship and the vividness of the impression evoked by each one of them, inflection19 
arises, as if automatically, as the verbal expression of what is intuited and felt. 
At the same time, however, it is remarkable to see in what various ways the mental outlook 
arrives here at sentence-formation. It does not set out from a prototype, does not laboriously 
put the sentence together, but achieves this without any forethought, in that it merely 
confers shape in sound upon the sharp and fully-registered impression of the object. In that 
this happens correctly each time, and according to the same feeling, the thought becomes 
coordinated out of the words so formed. […] 
Spontaneous positing in languages. There are points in the grammatical structure of languages 
at which this synthesis, and the power that produces it, come nakedly and directly in view, 
as it were, and with which all the rest of the language-structure is then also necessarily most 
intimately connected. Since the synthesis we are speaking of is not a state [Beschaffenheit], nor 
even properly a deed [Handlung], but itself a real action, always passing with the moment, there 
can be no special sign for it in the words, and the endeavour to find such a sign would 
already in itself bear witness to a lack of true strength in the act, in that its nature was 
misunderstood. The real presence of the synthesis must reveal itself immaterially, as it were, 
in the language. […] We may call this act in general – as I have done here in this particular 
case [if, in a language, a root is marked out by a suffix as a substantive] – the act of 
spontaneous positing by bringing-together (synthesis). It recurs everywhere in language. […] 
The verb (to speak first of this by itself) differs in a sharply determinate way from the noun, and 
from the other parts of speech that might possibly occur in a simple sentence, in that to it 
alone is assigned the act of synthetic positing as a grammatical function. Like the declined 
noun, it arose through such an act, in the fusion of its elements, with the stem, but it has also 
received this form in order to have the office and capacity of itself again performing this act 
with regard to the sentence. Between it and the other words of the simple sentence, there is 
therefore a difference which forbids us to count it along with them in the same category. All 
the other words of the sentence are like dead matter lying there for combination; the verb alone is the 
                                                 
19 Regarding Leibniz’s idea of reducing relations to properties, and therefore the possibility of 
conceiving, for instance, a declinable root of a verb, with the entities around it as a basis of property 
with its modifications, see (Orilia, 2000). 
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centre, containing and disseminating life. Through one and the same synthetic act, it conjoins, 
by being, the predicate with the subject, yet in such a way that the being which passes, with an 
energetic predicate, into an action, becomes attributed to the subject itself, so that what is 
thought as merely capable of conjunction becomes, in reality, a state or process. […] The 
thought, if one may put it so concretely, departs through the verb, from its inner abode, and steps 
across into reality.” (Humboldt, 1999; italics added).  
We note with surprise both the profound consonance and the logical and semantic 
refinement which are apparent between these last lines and the following, written some 
decades later (1835-1892), always in Germany, by Gottlob Frege:  
“[…] In every judgement, [a judgement, for me, is not the mere comprehension of a thought, 
but the admission of its truth] no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to 
the level of reference (the objective), has already been taken. 
One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not as that of sense 
to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate. […] The truth claim arises […] from 
the form of the declarative sentence […] It follows that the relation of the thought to the 
True may not be compared with that of subject to predicate. Subject and predicate 
(understood in the logical sense) are indeed elements of thought; they stand on the same 
level for knowledge. By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never 
passes from sense to reference, never from a thought to its truth value. One moves at the 
same level but never advances from one level to the next. A truth value cannot be a part of a 
thought, any more than, say, the Sun can, for it is not a sense but an object. (Frege, 1952) […] 
Judgements can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth value. Naturally this 
cannot be a definition. Judgement is something quite peculiar and incomparable. One might 
also say that judgements are distinctions of parts within truth values. Such distinction 
occurs by a return to the thought.” (Frege, 1952) 
One year earlier (1891) Frege had stated a parallelism between equations and statements. 
“The linguistic form of equations is a statement…. “  (Frege, 1952)20 
“I am concerned to show that the argument does not belong with the function, but goes 
together with the function to make up a complete whole; for the function by itself must be called 
incomplete, in need of supplementation or ‘unsaturated’. And in this respect functions differ 
fundamentally from numbers. Since such is the essence of the function, we can explain why, 
on the one hand, we recognize the same function in ‘2·1³ + 1’ and ‘2·2³ + 2’, even though 
these expressions stand for different numbers, whereas, on the other hand, we do not find 
one and the same function in ‘2·1³ + 1’  and ‘4 – 1’ in spite of their equal numerical values. 
Moreover, we now see how people easily led to regard the form of the expression as what is 
essential to the function. We recognize the function in the expression by imagining the latter 
as split up, and the possibility of thus splitting it up is suggested by its structure. 
The two parts into which the mathematical expression is thus split up, the sign of the 
argument and the expression of the function, are dissimilar; for the argument is a number, a 
whole complete in itself, as the function is not. (We may compare this with the division of a 
line by a point. One is inclined in that case to count the dividing-point along with both 
                                                 
20 Cf. (Raynaud, 2002). 
www.intechopen.com
 
Semantics – Advances in Theories and Mathematical Models 
 
66
segments; but if we want to make a clean division, i.e. so as not to count anything twice over 
or leave anything out, then we may only count the dividing-point along with one segment. 
This segment thus becomes fully complete in itself, and may be compared to the argument; 
whereas the other is lacking in something – vid. the dividing-point, which one may call its 
endpoint, does not belong to it. Only by completing it with this endpoint, or with a line that 
has two endpoints, do we get from it something entire.” (Frege, 1952  [24-25]). 
The “entirety” of the whole starts to become the Leitmotiv of so many and so various 
contributions. Frege emphasises the idea by using two different images: incompleteness 
means in need of supplementation, while unsaturatedness (chemical suggestion21) is a 
segment without an endpoint.  
Another author, a great logician and semiotician well-endowed with chemical 
competences22, Charles Sanders Peirce, more or less in the same period (1892-1906), was 
developing a model which would be accepted and spread from the 20th century onwards.    
“A Predicate”, Peirce wrote in 1906, “is either non-relative, or a monad, that is, is explicitly 
indefinite in one extensive respect, as is ‘black’; or it is a dyadic relative, or dyad, such as 
‘kills’, or it is a polyadic relative, such as ‘gives’. These things must be diagrammatized in 
our system.” (Peirce 4.543) 
In 1892, the same year in which Frege published his On Sense and Reference, Peirce stated: “A 
rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chemical atom or radical with unsaturated bonds. 
A non-relative rhema is like a univalent radicle; it has but one unsaturated bond. A relative 
rhema is like a multivalent radical. The blanks of a rhema can only be filled by terms, or, 
what is the same thing, by ‘something which’ (or the like) followed by a rhema; or, two can 
be filled together by means of ‘itself’ or the like. So, in chemistry, unsaturated bonds can 
only be saturated by joining two of them, which will usually, though not necessarily, belong 
to different radicles. If two univalent radicles are united, the result is a saturated compound. 
So, two non-relative rhemas being joined give a complete proposition. […] And we may say 
that all rhemata are either singular, dual, or plural,” (Peirce, 3.421).  
But even more important than this multiplication of terms around the predicate is Peirce’s 
thesis of the difference between verbs and proper nouns (or pronouns). 
“The proposition, or sentence, signifies that an eternal fitness, or truth, attaches certain 
hecceities to certain parts of an idea” (Peirce 3.461). “It is - in fact - the connection of an 
indicative word [of an index] to a symbolic word which makes an assertion (Peirce 4.56)23.  
Such a ‘dissimilarity’ (Frege), or ‘asymmetry’ (Mathesius), is the condition of that ‘fitness’ Peirce 
writes about. Without it, instead of an ‘attachment’ (Peirce) or of the unity of a line where 
segments meet (Frege), of an intertwining (Plato),  or of a ‘synthesis’ or  a ‘syntheke’24 (Aristotle), a 
couple (Abelard), we would have just a co-presence25, a juxtaposition, a mere addition. 
                                                 
21 See Picardi, 1994. 
22 Peirce completed an M.A in chemistry  in 1862, and a Bachelor of Science in 1863 at Harvard 
University. 
23 Cf. (Fumagalli, 1995). The  last two quoted passages are dated 1896 and 1893 respectively. 
24 See Lo Piparo, 2003. 
25 Against the “two-term theory,”see (Geach, 1972). About a medieval semantics of verb not 
“reabsorbed” by the semantics of noun see (Marmo, 2004). 
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In order to arrive at conclusions which oppose mere cumulativity, Bühler writes some 
memorable pages, at the opening of the fourth part of his Theory of Language, on “The Make-
up of Human Speech: Elements and Compositions”, contrasting the incipit of Leibniz’s 
Monadology about composites as accumulation  or aggregatum of simples with the 
Aristotelian concept of synthesis, later encountered in Kant, Hegel, Cassirer, Wundt. He then 
states: “the old disjunctive question has found a new home in our contemporaries’ minds, 
but with various new names; psychologists who profess the ‘idea of Gestalt’ or some ‘holistic 
view’ normally draw boundaries and erect barriers in its name against the ‘amas ou 
aggregatum’ because hardly anyone wants to be counted among the ‘atomists’ or 
elementarians.  […] On the one hand anyone can mention the so-called summative wholes 
as an example of an aggregate in the strict sense; and on the other hand the sentence is a 
handy illustration as a last resort to make even the blind see that Leibniz’s analysis cannot 
be generally applied: it is said that the sentence is obviously more than and different from 
an aggregate of words. […] We rather will remain on the ground of sematology and try to 
find out whether both claims can be understood and maintained in one breath with respect 
to significative structures, namely the claim that they are aggregates in one respect and 
synthemata in another. That is precisely what they are; we shall only be able to gain a 
correct view of the relationship of the words to the sentence unit by changing the aspect 
under which we regard the issue, by shifting the approach; we must make this shift of 
attitude […]. The nature of this shift can be stated without a trace of mystery or of mysticism 
or paradox. If there are two different sort of thing in the sentence, namely symbols and a 
field, then two separate counts can without contradiction reach the result n in the former  
case and the result 1 in the latter case. Leibniz, the productive mathematician, will be quite 
right if he determines the result n as a sum of units; but the one field unit will not be a 
merely symbolic sum.” (Bühler, 2011). 
We could continue quoting ad infinitum, but the purpose here is merely to underline the fact 
that two different directions need be followed in a complementary way while respectively 
producing (encoding) and understanding (decoding) a message (a text), at least a sentence 
to begin with: top-down in the first case – from the whole communicative intention to its 
segmentation in predication -, bottom-up in the second – from lexemes and morphemes to 
phrases and their structure. Compositionality (the value of totality is a function of the value 
of its parts) is then plausible; this, though, is secondary to the primacy of the thesis that the 
totality is more than the sum of its parts, a thesis according to which we are able to explain 
sentences as units at their sources. 
Ultimately we would like to reflect a convergent approach shared by the fathers of the two 
main contemporary grammatical models: dependency grammar and constituency grammar.     
Lucien Tesnière, to whom the so-called dependency grammars are ascribed, opens his 
Esquisse d’une syntaxe structural (1953) as follows:  
“CONNECTION. In the sentence Alfred sings, how many elements are there? 
Two, we would normally answer: Alfred and sings. 
Only one, would be the guess of those who feel the unity of the sentence. 
Three, we say, taking into account the two previous answers: 
1. = Alfred 
2. = sings 
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3. = finally and above all, the link which unites unit Alfred and sings, and without which 
we would only have two independent ideas, with no relationship between them, and 
no organised thought. 
We will give to this link, without which there is no possible sentence, the name connection. 
The connection is the soul of the sentence, its vital and organising principle. It ensures 
structural function. […]  
STEMMA. The structure of the sentence depends upon the architecture of its connections. 
Structural syntax is the science which studies this architecture. 
The stemma is the graphical representation of the architecture of the connections. […] The 
stemma may be linear or forked. The forked stemma may have a bifurcation, a trifurcation 
or an even more complex ramification:   
 
LINEAR STEMMA FORKED STEMMA 
 Bifurcation Trifurcation 













Alfred           the book         to Charles 
[…] 
STEMMATIC ANALYSIS. The structural syntax method consists essentially of reconstituting 
the stemma of a given utterance, that is to recognise the internal architecture. The 
establishment of the stemma constitutes stemmatic analysis, which includes both 
grammatical analysis and logical analysis and which it replaces in a positive and 
advantageous manner. […] 
VERB. The verb is the node of nodes. It is the verb which, directly or indirectly, controls the 
whole sentence. As such, it appears at the top of the stemma. This is why, when we establish 
a stemma, a good way is to start with the verb. […] 
The immediate subordinates of the verb are the agents and the circonstants. 
AGENTS. We give the name agents to the subordinates of the verb which participate in any 
way in the action. […] 
CIRCONSTANTS. We give the name circonstants to the subordinates of the verb which 
indicate the circumstances of the action: time, place, manner, etc. The number of the 
circonstants is unlimited. ” (Tesnière, 1953).  
In order to remind ourselves that predication is the basic structure of both queries and 
answers, we refer to Tesnière’s proposal about ‘interrogation’: 
“In the sentence : Alfred sings, three questions may arise (which confirms that there are three 
elements) : 
- Who sings? 
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- What does Alfred do? 
- Does Alfred sing? 
NUCLEAR INTERROGATION. In the sentence: Who sings? the question concerns the 
subordinate nucleus, which is emptied of the meaning Alfred, and where only the 
interrogative word Who? exists. We would say that there is a nuclear interrogation. 
 
sings                       sings  
    │                              │ 
  who?                      Alfred 
                     
When the nuclear interrogation is made with an empty nucleus, the corresponding response 
is made with a full nucleus: Who sings? Alfred sings. It is even enough to fill the nucleus 
without repeating the rest of the sentence:  Who sings? Alfred. 
The sentence: What does Alfred do? is also a nuclear interrogation. What does Alfred do? Alfred 
sings or simply: He sings. The only difference is that this time the question is on the 
controlling nucleus. 
To summarise, the sentence:  Alfred sings, having two nuclei, can give rise to two nuclear 
interrogations. We can see from this that a phrase can give rise to as many nuclear 
interrogations as it has nuclei.  
Nuclear interrogations are made via question words, of which the main ones are:  
For agents: who? – what? 
For circonstants: where? – when? – how?- why? 
For epithet: which? 
For example: Which book is Alfred looking at? Alfred is looking at the red book or simply: The red 
one.   
CONNECTIONAL INTERROGATION. In the sentence: Does Alfred sing? the two nuclei  
Alfred and sings are full. The question is therefore not nuclear. Effectively, Alfred and the 
action of singing are given. What we don't know is whether the two notions should be joined 
together, that is, if there is a connection between them. The questions is thus about the 
connection. We would say there is a connectional interrogation. […] 
If the connectional interrogation is made with a full nucleus, the corresponding response is 
made with an empty one. This is why a single word is enough: yes or no:  
Does Alfred sing? – Yes. 
Yes means : There is a connection. 
No means : There is not a connection. 
To summarise, the phrase Alfred sings can give rise to three questions, two nuclear and one 
connectional.” (Tesnière, 1953). 
As far as Chomsky is concerned, here we shall only recall that in generative, or more 
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So far we have reached the 1950s. 
For the 1960s I wish to mention two independent semantic turns within two different 
traditions: František Daneš’ Three-level Approach to Syntax (1964) and following articles and 
Charles Fillmore’s The Case for Case (1968) with its further developments. 
Without being able to dwell upon each of these contributions, I think both of them deserve 
to be appreciated for their awareness of the importance of a sharp distinction and at the 
same time a strict correlation between the formal and the functional level (as typical of the 
Prague School) or, in other words, between the syntactic and the semantic levels of linguistic 
analysis (as was gradually being evidenced within the generative trend).  
Distinction does not mean separation. On the contrary, distinction allows better outlined 
relations, those which let the new generation of Czech linguists identify semantic patterns 
(something like the predicational categories already investigated by Sundén) such as: 
process; agent–action–the object of action; the bearer of state–state; individual–predication of a feature 
to it; individual–placing it into a class; etc. (Daneš, 1964).  
“The framework of Functional Generative Description [FGD]”, states Petr Sgall, “has been 
designed so as to handle sentence structure in its anthropocentric aspects, i.e. based on 
syntactic dependency (the core of which, at least in most European languages, is the pattern 
of actor and action) and comprising the topic-focus articulation, i.e. specifying sentences not 
just as abstract objects, but as anchored in interactive context; this opens a way to 
understand them as operations on the hearer’s states of mind. 
FGD offers a basis for a relatively economic description, since the sentence representation 
having the shape of a dependency tree (with the verb at its root) contains only nodes 
corresponding to lexical items proper, rather than to nonterminals and function 
morphemes.” (Sgall, 2006); paper originally published in 1997). 
In the report of Charles Fillmore’s The Case for Case, his work is introduced in these terms: 
“The grammatical notion ‘case’ deserves a place in the base component of the grammar of 
every language. It is argued that past research has not led to valid insights on case 
relationships and that what is needed is a conception of base structure in which case 
relationships are primitive terms of the theory and in which such concepts as ‘subject’ and 
‘direct object’ are missing.”   (Fillmore, 1967). 
More than forty years later, we can conclude that the cognitive turn in linguistics has 
become stronger. The notion of case has evolved into that of frame. The latter, together with 
the notion of script, had, in the meantime, gained  ground26.  
It would be fruitful to compare the finite set, the list of cases with the results of other similar 
enterprises: tectogrammatical roles in Prague Dependency Treebank27, Chomsky’s thematic 
roles/Theta Roles28.  
                                                 
26 (Minsky, 1974); (Schank, Abelson,1977). 
27 http://ufal.mff.cuni.cz/pdt2.0/doc/manuals/en/t-layer/html/ch11s05s01.html  
28 In generative grammar, a theta role or θ-role is the formal device for representing syntactic argument 
structure (number and type of noun phrases) required by a particular verb. Thematic roles or relations 
are their semantic correspondents. Theta comes from thematic. 
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What we eventually want to do is to make explicit some conclusions which can be arrived at 
from the wide perspective so far explored:  
1. Factual oversimplifications are not admitted: verbs usually cannot be alone, but 
sometimes they can (I’m not speaking about ellipses), given that zerovalent verbs exist 
(as atmospheric verbs in many languages) (Malchukov, Sievierska, 2011). 
2. Metalinguistic oversimplifications are not admitted either: neither the correlation 
subject-property (suggested by Aristotle) nor that of agent-action (suggested by 
Tesnière’s terminology) always stand, and not everywhere: they are merely  pars pro toto 
representations29. 
3. However, what can be seen as an interesting, though covert, convergence between two 
main models of predication is something underlying the conviction about sentence unit: 
that is to say that both the Aristotelian paraphrase ‘man is walking’ for ‘man walks’ and 
the Fregean symbolic transcription W (m) = 1, or W (m) = 030 attest to the feeling of a 
relationship, of a reference from the foreground to the background, from the present 
being to the whole one, from the determined knowledge to the totality of what can be 
judged, as Frege calls it (das Beurteilbare, the judgeable), from the objects the sentence is 
about, to the world (actual or possible) it has been assigned to. 
To better understand this fundamental belonging of the “case in question” to what it is 
included within, without being reducible to it, is a worthwhile goal: the result will be to 
understand that difficult but stimulating balance which is provided by relating something 
determined to something abstract, a dream – as Peirce would say – to an index31, thoughts  
to worlds and worlds to thoughts. 
3.4 Predication without or before judgement. Propositions vs. propositional functions  
Just a couple of further statements before leaving the subject of predication.  
As widely considered, we need predication before judging32. We need it to ask questions, to 
make requests, to give orders, to plea, to pray, to express wonder and so on. Predication 
deserves attention as an act of thinking, as a logical and psychological matter, as a semiotic, 
linguistic ability, as a communicative deed.  Before judgements we utter questions, doubts, 
hypotheses, shaping our thoughts while still suspending our evaluations. 
Formalising this distinction means distinguishing between propositional functions and 
propositions, between unsaturated connections and saturated ones. Saturated through what 
device? Completed by what?, if ever … 
3.5 Affirming or denying 
In a sentence deprived of its context no linguistic evidence (in the etymological sense of the 
word, i.e. seeable verbal constituents) can be displayed as the marker of an accomplished 
                                                 
29 Regarding the importance of an ontology of events, for predicates referring to events, see (Davidson, 
1980). 
30 The formula means that the predicate ‘walk’ being saturated by its argument identifies the truth 
value: either 1 (true) or 0 (false). 
31 “A verb by itself signifies a mere dream, an imagination unattached to any particular occasion. It calls 
up in the mind an icon” (Peirce 3.459).  
32 See (Davidson, 2005). 
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saturation (or, rather, as the mark of an ended task). No morpheme, no lexeme proper; 
intonation, rather, an unsuspended one; word order, possibly. But most of all, the plain 
intonation of an assertion contrasted with, for example, the rising intonation of a question. 
What does this mean? Different authors in different contexts have underlined the presence 
of a covert constituent in judging: the personal assent or dissent which determines the 
affirmative or negative structure of predication itself in assertions, and constitutes its 
illocutionary force. 
After having quoted Frege’s expressions on this point (3.3), let us recall Brentano’s 
statements about the role of assenting (or dissenting) while judging: once an object is given 
in presentation, with our judgements we express its acceptance or rejection (Brentano, 1995).  
This way of considering the further commitment involved through an act of judgement 
helps us gain a unified perspective on the two different kinds of questions mentioned in § 
2.3.  Any assertion – this is the suggestion – qualifies itself as a yes or no answer, even if 
apparently no question at all has generated it; completive questions just pave the way for 
oriented questions. Answers will then confirm or deny the orientation proposed, thus 
underlining the strict relationship between predicate as sentence-centre and predication as 
basic syntagmatic act, whatever  illocutionary act may follow, be it an assertion or not. 
4. Tools and resources: from WordNet to FrameNet et alia 
After having reconstructed some basic steps of the more than bi-millennial thread of 
philosophic-linguistic thought, the next move must be that one of a recognition of data, in 
order to check the validity of theoretical contributions. From this point of view we are now 
in a privileged position, that of scholars favoured by the creation of a specific area of studies, 
computational linguistics and related resources, which support and provide inspiration to 
the theorists. 
From the works of ancient grammarians to those of present-day linguists, the interplay 
between data and theory has always been of vital importance in developing sound, deep 
competences. 
The work is hard, but well worth the effort and avoids restricting ourselves to armchair 
philosophy (Austin 1956/57) or armchair linguistics (Fillmore 1992). 
“Armchair linguistics – writes Fillmore -  does not have a good name in some linguistics 
circles. A caricature of the armchair linguist is something like this. He sits in a deep soft 
comfortable armchair, with his eyes closed and his hands clasped behind his head. Once in a 
while he opens his eyes, sits up abruptly shouting, “Wow, what a neat fact!”, grabs his 
pencil, and writes something down. Then he paces around for a few hours in the excitement 
of having come still closer to knowing what language is really like. 
(There isn’t anybody exactly like this, but there are some approximations). 
Corpus linguistics does not have a good name in some linguistics circles. A caricature of the 
corpus linguist is something like this. He has all of the primary facts that he needs, in the 
form of a corpus of approximately one zillion running words, and he sees his job as that of 
deriving secondary facts from his primary facts. At the moment he is busy determining the 
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relative frequencies of the eleven parts of speech as the first word of a sentence versus as the 
second word of a sentence. 
(There isn’t anybody exactly like this, but there are some approximations). 
These two don’t speak to each other very often, but when they do, the corpus linguist says 
to the armchair linguist, ‘Why should I think that what you tell me is true?’, and the 
armchair linguist says to the corpus linguist, ‘Why should I think that what you tell me is 
interesting?'” (Fillmore, 1992). 
By ‘linguistic resources’ we mean “Collections of data which primarily document 
communicative acts of humans by some form of recording and/or descriptions, both 
directly as in corpora, or at higher levels of abstraction in lexicons and ontologies. The 
primary data can be text, video recording and/or audio tracks.”33  
In 2010 a new initiative was launched by LREC (Language Resources and Evaluation 
Conference) in its 7th edition, the 
Compilation of a Map of Language Resources, Technologies and Evaluation, “a collective 
enterprise of the LREC community, as a first step towards the creation of a very broad, 
community-built, Open Resource Infrastructure; […] The map was intended to monitor the 
use and creation of language resources (datasets, tools, etc.)”34.   
We will now mention some of the main resources available, which can enable data collection 
and annotation at different levels about them, in a bottom-up direction. 
4.1 WordNet and MultiWordNet 
Firstly we shall start with lexical units, just words: WordNet “is a large lexical database of 
English. Nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs are grouped into sets of cognitive synonyms 
(synsets), each expressing a distinct concept. Synsets are interlinked by means of conceptual-
semantic and lexical relations”35. From the point of view of our subject, predication and 
predicate-argument relationship, of particular note is that “The majority of the WordNet’s 
relations connect words from the same part of speech (POS). Thus, WordNet really consists 
of four sub-nets, one each for nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, with few cross-POS 
pointers. Cross-POS relations include the “morphosemantic” links that hold among 
semantically similar words sharing a stem with the same meaning: observe (verb), observant 
(adjective) observation, observatory (nouns). In many of the noun-verb pairs the semantic 
role of the noun with respect to the verb has been specified: {sleeper, sleeping_car} is the 
LOCATION for {sleep} and {painter}is the AGENT of {paint}, while {painting, picture} is its 
RESULT.” 
MultiWordNet is a multilingual lexical database, aligned with Princeton WordNet36. 
http://multiwordnet.fbk.eu/english/home.php  
                                                 
33 From the Glossary of INTERA project:: http://www.mpi.nl/INTERA/  






Semantics – Advances in Theories and Mathematical Models 
 
74
4.2 Treebanks and annotated corpora 
The creation of annotated corpora at different levels (layers) constitutes a further 
development and a sound premise for a good selection of metadata. Here, we refer only to 
the creation of annotated corpora in a great deal of different languages at the syntactic level, 
treebanks, and to the systematically planned discussion about the relationship between 
annotation as such, and the adoption of apparatus according to which annotation needs to 
be done (not only manually, but also automatically, of course): the Treebanks and Linguistic 
Theories (TLT) conference series37.  
4.3 PropBank et relata 
From lexicon (and lexicography) through syntax: the step towards propositions has been 
taken and the results can be viewed in the realised and on-going project of PropBank, which 
adds predicate-argument relations to the syntactic trees of Penn-Treebank (concerning 
English language), thus achieving a corpus of text annotated with information about basic 
semantic propositions. In connection with this project, a continuation aims at creating 
Parallel PropBanks (the English-Chinese Treebank/PropBank)38.  
Based upon PropBank, once again top-down observation and analysis has been carried out, 
generating a verb index39 (a system which merges links and web pages from four different 
natural language processing projects) and an index of nouns40, the goal of which is to mark 
the sets of arguments that cooccur with nouns in PropBank. They are the Unified Verb Index 
and Nombank. 
4.4 FrameNet and Semlink. Towards increasing semantic annotation and resource 
combination  
In order to expand the annotation from the syntactic to the semantic level and to achieve 
frames passing through verbs and valences, other resources have been produced and are 
still under construction, their development being possible in relation to different corpora 
and languages: VerbNet41 (the largest on-line verb lexicon currently available for English) 
and valence lexica42 according to the PDT-ValencyLexicon43 model. 
The most refined annotation on the semantic level of predicate-argument relationship is still 
provided by FrameNet44, Fillmore’s Project, is consistent with his life-long research into 
                                                 
37 The list of the first seven conferences is published at http://tlt8.unicatt.it/Links.htm ; the addresses of 
the last three edition are the following: http://tlt8.unicatt.it/ ;  http://math.ut.ee/tlt9/index.html ; 
http://tlt10.cl.uni-heidelberg.de/ See also, for a case study regarding a particular predicative structure, 
(Bamman, Passarotti, Crane, 2008).  
38 http://verbs.colorado.edu/~mpalmer/projects/ace.html  
39 http://verbs.colorado.edu/verb-index/ 
40 http://nlp.cs.nyu.edu/meyers/NomBank.html  
41 http://verbs.colorado.edu/~mpalmer/projects/verbnet.html  
42 Cf. http://jochenleidner.posterous.com/english-valency-lexicon-online 
43 See (Hajič, J., Panevová, J.,  Urešová, Z., Bémová, A., Kolářová, V., Pajas, P., 2003 ) and 
http://ufal.mff.cuni.cz/PDT-Vallex/ PDT-Vallex contains at the time of writing (January 2012) over 
11000 valency frames for more than 7000 verbs. It has been built in close connection with the Prague 
Czech-English Dependency Treebank project. 
44 https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/  
www.intechopen.com
 
Queries and Predicate – Argument Relationship 
 
75 
cases, first, and then frames. “The FrameNet project is building a lexical database of English 
that is both human- and machine-readable, based on annotating examples of how words are 
used in actual texts. From the student’s point of view, it is a dictionary of more than 10,000 
word senses, most of them with annotated examples that show the meaning and usage. For 
the researcher in Natural Language Processing, the more than 170,000 manually annotated 
sentences provide a unique training dataset for semantic role labeling, used in applications 
such as information extraction, machine translation, event recognition, sentiment analysis, 
etc. For students and teacher of linguistics it serves as a valence dictionary, with uniquely 
detailed evidence for the combinatorial properties of a core set of the English vocabulary.”   
As it is already evident both from a strategic, epistemological point of view and from a 
practical  one, resource compatibility and unification are highly appreciable and not only as 
a goal to be pursued in the future. SemLink, for instance, is “the effort to map between 
complementary lexical resources: WordNet, FrameNet , VerbNet and PropBank. The goal is 
to develop a broad-coverage, unified English resource that has a fine granularity and rich 
semantics of Word-Net and Frame-Net, that is a platform for syntactically based 
generalizations based on VerbNet, and that provides PropBank style effective training data 
for supervised Machine Learning techniques.” (Palmer, 2009) 
We would like to conclude our quick survey by quoting Martha Palmer’s words at the 
conclusion of the same paper: “Efforts to link the PropBank/VerbNet and FrameNet 
resources to one another and to WordNet, and to define semantics for the roles used by each 
resource, are a likely avenue for future improvements in semantic role labeling systems, and 
will benefit Question-Answering, Information Extraction and other NLP applications.” Let’s 
pursue such avenues.   
5. Conclusion 
We have considered the differences between questions and requests, and their co-presence 
in the structure of queries.  
Because of the so-called “descriptive fallacy” in philosophy of language, it took rather a long 
time to give them the attention they were due. Thanks to pragmatics, this oversight has been 
rectified. 
Asking questions testifies to the strong relationship between lack of determinacy (poverty, 
both in knowledge and in action) and the need to overcome it (in order to attain 
plentifulness). Interrogative structures are devices where triggers such as wh-words or 
suspended assent are at work to retrieve missing information,  extract knowledge, or receive 
the cooperation requested. 
Answers are therefore not only assertions, but also permissions, prohibitions, orders, 
suggestions, etc. The logico-linguistic structure which is always required across this variety of 
speech acts and which makes possible the wording of questions and requests is predication.  
Even in elliptical or simply verbless sentences, predication is at work albeit implicit or 
implied. To be at work means that it is a necessary condition for the complete efficiency and 
comprehensibility of the sentence itself. To be at work, then, means that the 
addressee/hearer/reader has to bear in mind, or retrieve, the predication, where the 
absence of recognition would prevent him/her from understanding the meaning, i.e. the 
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semantics of the sentence. In crosstalk such as “Ready?” “Not yet.”, no verb appears, but 
predication is easily recognisable, as implicit (in the question) or implied (in the answer): 
Implicit, specifically as a part of the first turn “[Are you] ready?”, and implied as the whole 
turn upon which negation operates.  The role of negation is in fact that of an operator, the 
scope of which is the whole preceding sentence structure: [It is] not yet [true that I am 
ready]”, i.e. the preceding sentence deprived of its interrogative mood, that is to say without 
the suspension of assent typical of oriented questions, and shifted to the second person 
(addressee) to the first one (sender).   
During our reconstruction of the basic views on such an evergreen topic in logic and 
linguistic inquiries as predication, we have argued that some routes need to be modified: 
i. Before predicates, theory must put predication as the basic syntagmatic act. This means 
the adoption of a pragmatic framework. 
ii. Before articulating predicative relations, the sentence unit must be asserted and the 
reasons investigated, thus avoiding both factual and metalinguistic oversimplification. 
Bottom-up approaches need to be balanced by top-down approaches, which deserve a 
certain priority due to the causative role of the speaker and of his/her communicative 
intention, which gives rise to the actualisation of the speech act and to the processing of 
its constituents by the addressee. Compositionality is a function of (con)textuality and 
not vice versa.  
iii. ‘Dissimilarity’, or ‘asymmetry’ of components (typically nouns and verbs) is the 
condition of  ‘fitness’ which joins sentence constituents. Without it, we would merely 
have  a co-presence, a juxtaposition, a simple addition. Beyond this, both Aristotelian 
and Fregean models attest to the feeling of a further (second step) relationship, a 
reference from the foreground to the background, from the present being (through the 
copula) to being as such; from single, determined objects of the spoken domain to the 
universe of discourse (the co-domain instituted as the truth or falsehood which the 
predicate-argument relationship refers to); from the objects the sentence is about, to the 
world (actual or possible) it has been assigned to. Moreover, this asymmetry is also 
active on another layer, that of communicative dynamism (topic-focus articulation, 
functional sentence perspective). Within the speech, participants in the conversation / 
communication exchange need to move from what is known to something new; they 
need to increase their already shared world of reference to new information / action 
upon it.  
iv. Higher units, such as texts, may be further requested, but at least questions/requests 
and answers cannot be mutually isolated. Moreover, a useful insight into a textual 
(macro)structure can be derived from the identification of the question(s) and request(s) 
which may be considered, albeit implicitly, to be the source of the text itself. 
v. The newest solutions proposed to capture the structure of the predicative link - which 
keeps queries and answers together- support the idea of a semantic unity displayed 
through a plurality of roles and their gradual identification or confirmation: this is what 
concepts such as functions, cases, stemmas, frames and scripts suggest - barring gaps at 
the beginning – who does what?, when does this happen? etc. – which have to be filled 
as an on-going task. 
vi. Unproven or simply intuited theoretical endeavours deserve access to data, as rich and 
varied as possible, in order to test their validity. In the privileged position made 
possible by computational linguistic tools and resources, philosophers of language, 
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logicians, linguists and other scholars, aware of the multi-secular history of human 
thought on these topics, can now also carry out field-work. Mutual advantage is 
expected. 
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